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Jenkinson: Alcoholic Liquors--Effect of Lewis v. Gaddy on the South Carolina

ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS- EFFECT OF
LEWIS V. GADDY ON THE
SOUTH CAROLINA "BROWN BAGGING" LAW
I.

INTROTUcVroN

The controversial and much disputed "brown bagging"' law
of South Carolina, which suffered from a lack of enforcement 2
has become under attack and has been further diluted by Lewis
v. Gaddy,3 decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
April, 1970. The problem of unsatisfactory liquor legislation,
enforcement, and the sale of liquor by the drink has plagued the
4
people and the legislature for over one hundred years.
The basic problem raised in Gaddy was validity of section
4-95 of the South Carolina Code of Laws which states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to store or to have
in possession any alcoholic liquors in his place of business other than a licensed liquor store. A place of business shall include:
(1) Any place where goods, wares or merchandise
are sold, offered for sale or distributed, and also places
of business.;
The divided court held that owners or employees of a business
establishment having a possession and consumption permit
could possess alcohol on the premises without violating the
existing law. The court came to this conclusion by finding that
section 4-95 had been impliedy repealed by the enactment of the
"brown bagging" statute, which repeal rendered invalid any
restrictions place upon licensees or their employees as to the
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-29 (Supp. 1969).

2. When the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission was established, 25
agents were assigned to enforce the "brown bagging" law, all under the control and direction of the Commission. Much controversy was raised by citizens
who complained that the agents were too strict in their enforcement. Poltical
pressure resulted in 10 of these agents being transferred to the State Law
Enforcement Division, this leaving only a few agents to enforce these laws.
The legislature accomplished this by reducing the budget of the A.B.C.
Commission by $108,060.00 from 1968 to 1969. See LV S. C. STATS. AT LARGE
2945 (No. 1263 1968); LVI S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 533 (No. 349 1969).
3. Lewis v. Gaddy, 173 S.E2d 376 (S.C. 1970).
4. Hibbard, A History of South Carolina Liquor Regulation 19 S.C.L.
RIv. 157 (1967).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-95 (Supp. 1969).
6. According to section 4-29, a possession and consumption permit allows
the patron of a licensed establishment to bring his liquor in a brown bag
and consume on the premises. The licensee is then allowed to mix the drink
and sell "setups."
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keeping of alcoholic liquors on the licensed premises. The
Gaddy decision led to immediate speculation that open bars
would be allowed in South Carolina, 7 a proposition which will
be discussed below.
II.

LMwis v.

GADDY

The respondent, the proprietress of a restaurant and bar
known as "Gaddy's Owl Club," located at Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina, had been issued a possession and consumption permit.
Her husband, an employee, parked his automobile, containing
twenty-four half-pints of legal liquor 8 in an adjacent parking
lot. After agents of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission discovered this, the licensee had her license suspended and
was fined after a hearing before the Commission. This action
was taken under section 4-95, which made unlawful possession
of legal liquor by a licensee or an employee on the premises of
the establishment. On appeal to the trial court, this ruling was
reversed because the automobile was found not to be "on the
premises" within the meaning of section 4-95. 9
The subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court was based
mainly on the question of the pn'o tanto, or implied repeal of
section 4-95 and not the "premises" question relied upon in the
trial court.10 Justice Bussey, for the majority, found that section 4-29 pro tanto repealed section 4-95. Section 1-29 states
in part:
7. The term, "open bars," means an establishment which is licensed to
sell liquor by the drink to be lawfully consumed on the premises of the
establishment. For a good definition of a "bar," see Commonwealth v. Everson, 140 Mass. 292, 2 N.E. 839 (1885). Liquor by the drink is expressly forbidden in Article VIII, section 11, of the South Carolina State Constitution.
8. "Legal liquor" is alcoholic liquor properly stamped with federal and
state tax stamps as required by sections 4-91.1 and 65-1270 of the South Carolina Code of Laws.
9. The opinion of the trial court held that under section 4-29, the word,
"premises," had acquired a new meaning and now "premises" meant only "the
inside of the buildings where the licensee's business is carried on." Earlier
cases in South Carolina construed "premises" as used in section 4-95 to mean
all parts of one's place of business, including rooms, closets as well as yards
or courts, used in connection with the place of business. See State v. Brandon,
210 S.C. 495, 43 S.E.2d 449 (1947) ; State v. Phillips, 210 S.C. 249, 42 S.E.2d
339 (1947) ; State v. Schumpert, 195 S.C. 387, 11 S.E.2d 523 (1939).
10. The 'premises" argument was overshadowed by the pro tanto repeal
argument apparently because of the greater impact of the latter one. In the
trial court's opinion, only one sentence in the last paragraph made reference
to pro tanto repeal where the court said "[ilnsofar as these sections and
cases relate to businesses licensed under Section 10 of Act Number 398 of
1967, they were effectively repealed by said act because inconsistent therewith." The attorneys involved seized upon this sentence in planning the appeal,
placing more emphasis on the implied repeal argument.
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A. Notwithstanding any other provi ions of law, it
shall be lawful . . . for any person who is at least
twenty-one years of age to transport, possess or consume lawfully acquired alcoholic liquor in accordance
with the following: (1) Any person may transport
alcoholic liquors to and from any place where alcoholic
liquors may be lawfully possessed or consumed * * * *.
(4) It shall be lawful for any person to possess or consume alcoholic liquors on the premises of any business
establishment, except on Sunday provided the business
establishment meets the following requirements: (a)
The business is bona fide engaged primarily and substantially in the preparation and serving of meals or
furnishing lodging; and (b) The business has a permit
from the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission for
this purpose ....11
In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the legisla,tive intent was clear and unambiguous and allowed, no room
for statutory construction:
It is obvious, we think, from the plain and clear language of See. 4-29 that it was the legislative intent and
purpose to allow both the possession and consumption
of alcoholic liquors upon the premises of a business
establishment ....12
The key phrase in which the legislative intent was found was
that containing the words, "any person," as used in section 4-29.
These words would allow anyone to possess or consume alcoholic
liquors on the premises of a licensed establishment. Here the
court said:
[H]ad the General Assembly seen fit when it enacted
See. 4-29 to prohibit possession, consumption and transportation by the proprietor or the employees of an
establishment holding a possession and consumption
permit, it could easily have done so. Instead, it repeatedly used the phrase "any person", excluding only persons under twenty-one years of age. 13
In a strong dissent, Justice Littlejohn found that section 4-29
"did not repeal, expressly or by implication, any part of Section
4-95.1'14 He found these two sections capable of reconciliation
CODE ANN. § 4-29 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
12. 173 S.E2d at 379.

11. S.C.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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and that it was clearly not the intent of the legislature "to
legalize the possession of alcoholic liquors by employees of
restaurant operators who have procured possession and consumption [permits] ....

15 On the other hand it was clearly the

intention of the legislature "that only customers at a licensed
restaurant may possess and drink alcoholic beverages on the
premises .... 21
The court had to overcome several obstacles in arriving at
its conclusion. Repeal by implication is not favored in South
Carolina. 17 It has long been the law of this state that a later
statute will not be construed to repeal an earlier enactment by
implication unless it is "plainly repugnant" to the earlier statute, or fully embraces the whole subject matter of the law. The
dissent here found these two statutes reconcilable, because there
was no clear intent of the legislature to allow possession and
consumption of alcoholic liquors by the operators and employees
of a licensed restaurant. It would, therefore, be the duty of the
court to decide the proper interpretation, in effect reconciling
the two statutes. The majority had found the intent so clear and
the statutes so irreconcilable that no other construction could be
followed and the latter statute must prevail.
One of the most important considerations noted in the dissent
and by law enforcement officials, those most directly affected
by the decision, is that repeal of section 4-95 would create, "a
near hopeless law enforcement problem.., and it is reasonable
to assume that such was not intended." I8 Also, the dissent
found important the fact that the legislature did not specifically
repeal section 4-95, while it did expressly repeal several other
sections with which section 4-29 conflicted. 19 If it had been the
intent of the legislature to repeal section -95, this could have
easily been done by the inclusion of this section in the "brown
bagging statute." It seems evident from the exclusion of 4-95
that the legislature intended to retain those provisions of law
which would make it unlawful for the owner or employees of a
licensed establishment to possess liquor on the premises. On the
other hand, the legislature repealed sections 4-96 and 4-402 be15. Id.
16. Id. at 380.
17. State v. Hood, 181 S.C. 488, 188 S.E. 134 (1936); State v. Moore, 128
S.C. 192, 122 S.E. 672 (1924).
18. 173 S.E.2d at 380.
19. The "brown bagging" statute found in LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 571
(No. 398, 1967) expressly repeals sections 4-96, 4-109, 4-110, and 4-402 of

the Code.
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cause these dealt with patrons drinking in restaurants, an act
20
they intended to legalize.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF LEWIS V. GADDY

Although much debated, South Carolina's liquor laws have
been strictly construed through the years as prohibitory in
nature. Following the Gaddy decision there was, however, much
confusion in this area. This decision was contrary to the earlier
attitude of the court 2 ' in that the court liberally construed the
statute now making lawful the prior forbidden act of allowing
a licensee to possess legal liquor. For years the legislature has
had before it various attempts to "liberalize" our liquor laws,
all failing before that body or the people. 22 Just prior to
Gaddy, a "minibottle bill"2 3 which would have allowed licensed
establishments to sell "minibottles" containing an ounce and a
half of liquor was defeated. After Gaddy, this bill was recalled 24 because, according to one state senator, the authorities
were now left without power to "control, police, regulate, or tax
2
the sale of alcohol in establishments which have permits .... )
How "brown bagging" would be policed was a question raised
by law enforcement officials and holders of possession and
consumption permits. 26 As pointed out in the dissent in Gaddy,
this would create a big problem in the enforcement of the liquor
laws. Under the present rule, an ABC agent must actually see
the sale or delivery take place between the seller and buyer
before charges can be made under section 4-91.27
The real pandora's box opened by the court in Gaddy is the
question of whether or not an owner of a licensed possession and
consumption establishment would be able to "give away" his
20. 173 S.E.2d at 381.
21. The court earlier viewed liquor laws in a narrow sense and in favor
of the state on all such questions. See State v. Brandon, 210 S.C. 495, 43
S.E2d 449 (1947).

22. A proposed constitutional amendment to Article VIII, section 11, of
the state constitution, which prohibits the sale of liquor in bottles less than
one-half pint, and allows sale only in retail stores, was rejected by tie voters
of South Carolina in 1966.
23. The "minibottle bill" was a proposal to sell liquor in restaurants and
bars in one to two ounce bottles, in effect selling a drink. This change would
have been in the form of a constitutional amendment to Article VIII, section
11 of the state constitution.
24. The State, April 17, 1970, at 1B, col. 6.

25. The State, April 15, 1970, at 1C, col. 3 and 4.
26. The Attorney General's office received requests from law enforcement
officials dealing with the sale or delivery of liquor after the Gaddy decision
was announced. No official opinions were rendered.
27. 173 S.E.2d at 380 (by implication).
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own lawfully possessed liquor to his customers. 28 By such a
scheme the owner would either have a high "cover charge" or
sell "set ups" at the price of a drink of liquor and then generously provide the liquor at no charge to his customer. This
question will probably reach the supreme court in the near
future. 2 0 It does not seem likely that the court intended such
a strained construction to be placed on the Gaddy decision. The
court, apparently unknowingly, extended itself too far and
never suspected such controversy over this ruling. To allow a
licensee to use such a subterfuge merely because he can now lawfully possess liquor on the premises could not have been the
legislative intent under the "brown bagging" statute. This
would surely undermine the whole purpose of the statute as
well as be a judicial proclamation of "open bars" in South Carolina. The maxim--"You cannot do indirectly what you are forbidden to do directly"--seems appropriate here.
To allow the owners of a licensed establishment to conduct
such a practice would be an open violation of section 4-91 of the
Code. This section states:
§4-91. Unlawful manufacture, sale or transportation,
etc.-It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, store, keep, receive, have in possession, transport,
ship, buy, sell, barter, exchange or deliver any alcoholic
liquors, except liquor acquired in a legal manner, and
except in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, or to accept, receive or have in possession any
liquors for unlawful use under the provision's of this
chapter.30
Section 4-91 was applied in Pirates' Cove, Inc. v. Strom3 ' in a
situation similar to the one where there is a giving away of
liquor as explained above. In Pirates' Cove, a private club operated a bar where alcoholic liquors were sold to the members and
provided professional entertainment for them. This liquor was
purchased from licensed retail dealers, with South Carolina
liquor taxes paid. The club contended that it was "a private
club and, as such. . . . [could] sell liquor to its members and
28. This problem was ruled on in Winter v. A.B.C. Comm'n, ABC Order
(1970) by the South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission where
the defendant was found to have violated section 4-91 of the Code. This case

is now pending appeal to the state circuit court.
29. The Charleston Evening Post, July 9, 1970, at 12A, col. 1. See note 27
supra.
30. S.C.CoDE ANN. § 4-91 (Supp. 1969).
31. 249 S.C. 270, 153 S.E.?d 900 (1967).
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guests without a license, if the liquor was legally acquired." 32
The court held that section 4-91 makes it unlawful for any
person to sell alcoholic liquor unless (1) the liquor is acquired
in a legal manner and (2) in accordance with the provisions
governing the sale of liquor.3 3 Because the club in Pirates' Cove
was not licensed to sell liquor as required by the law, their sale
constituted a violation of section 4-91. 34 The club was in "[possession for unlawful sale, that is, without a license, [and] would
constitute possession for an unlawful use under the statuto. " ,a
The rule of possession for an unlawful use under section 4-91
is the proposition to be applied in the case of the licensed establishment "giving away" liquor with the "set ups." This licensee
can possess the liquor on the premises and be within the Gaddy
rule; however, when the possession is primarily to give away
the liquor to patrons, the use becomes unlawful under section
4-91. This would clearly be within section 4-91 because this
"giving away" would be a "sale," "exchange," or "delivery"
under this statute. In connection with liquor traffic the word
"sale" means the transfer of title from one party to another for
some consideration. 36 Here the consideration element would be
satisfied in that the customer receives the liquor and the licensee
generates "good will" 37 with his clientele and more business.
As applied under section 4-91 the "give away" scheme would
result in the licensee having violated the law. This would not
conflict with the Gaddy rule which makes possession by the
licensee lawful, nor with section 4-29 which allow "any person"
to transport possess, or consume lawfully acquired liquor in
licensed establishments. Section 4-91 carries these rules one step
further in saying that the party in lawful possession may not
use the liquor unlawfully by selling or delivering it.
The licensee, attempting the give away scheme, would, in
effect, be acting contrary to the purpose of the "brown bagging"
law which allows patrons to possess and consume alcoholic liquors on the premises, not purchase the liquor at the place of
32. Id. at 276.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
45 Am. JuR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 239 (1969).
Consideration may consist of some right, interest, profit, or benefit

accruing to one party, or some forebearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility

suffered or undertaken by another. Callahan v. Ridgeway, 138 S.C. 10, 135
S.E. 646 (1925).
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consumption.3 8 This type of scheme falls within the well settled
rule that the courts, where the sale of liquor is illegal, "will refuse to countenance any trick, artifice or subterfuge intended to
evade the law."3 9
Now that section 4-29 has been tested in the courts in relation
to section 4-95, effectively pro tanto repealing a portion of it,
what other statutes have arguably been pro tanto repealed?.
This question could be far reaching under our existing laws
leaving them in a questionable state given the interpretation
applied in Gaddy of the words, "any person," as used in section
4-29.
Because "any person" may now lawfully transport alcoholic
liquors to and from any place where alcoholic liquors may be
lawfully possessed and consumed, 40 it would seem that a person
may now purchase liquor in another state or on a military
reservation and lawfully bring it into South Carolina. 41 This
is within the rule stated above because alcoholic liquors were
lawfully purchased and transported within section 4-29.
According to section 4-92, it in unlawful for any person to
transport any alcoholic liquor, even though properly stamped, in
a taxi. The way "any person" is used applies only to taxi
drivers as long as a passenger transports the liquor in his baggage. Under section 4-29, the taxi driver like "any person"
should be able to carry his liquor and possess it within the rules
set forth in section 4-29.42 Apparently section 4-92 could have
been repealed to this extent.
Section 4-99 as it relates to the drinking of alcoholic liquors
on the premises of business establishments seems to have been
repealed in part. Section 4-29 specifically provides that "any
person may possess or consume alcoholic liquors in a private
38. 173 S.E.2d at 379, 380 (by implication). It is also unlawful for anyone
to purchase alcoholic liquor other than that purchased from licensed dealers
under section 4-94. See Pirates Cove v. Strom, 249 S.C. 270, 153 S.E.2d 900

(1967).

39. State v. Collins, 67 W. Va. 530, 68 S.E. 268 (1910).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-91 (Supp. 1969).
41. According to the present rule, it is a violation of section 65-1270 of
the Code to bring into South Carolina liquor not stamped with proper South
Carolina revenue stamps. See State v. Kilgore, 233 S.C. 6, 103 S.E2d 321

40. 173 S.E.2d at 376;

(1958).

42. Section 4-29(1) provides: "Any person may transport alcoholic liquors
to and from any place where alcoholic liquors may be lawfully possessed or
consumed; but if the cap or seal on the container has been opened or broken,
it shall be unlawful to transport it in any motor vehicle, except in the luggage
compartment or cargo area."
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residence, hotel room or motel room.

' 43

These are certainly busi-

ness establishments brought within the rule of Gaddy. Therefore, "any person" should be permitted to drink in licensed
establishments as well as those even in unlicensed hotel and
motel rooms which are business establishments.
One other questionable area is within section 4-100, which
makes it unlawful for any person to "publically engage in the
drinking of intoxicating liquors in the presence of passengers
or in any passenger car in the State ....
,44 If a person is
drinking publicly in his automobile while parked in the parking
lot of a license establishment, he would be on the "premises"
according to Gaddy.45 Then, according to the court, "[it follows that mere possession of alcoholic liquors, in such an area, of
necessity is expressly permitted by statute and is, therefore not
illegal."46 Possession and consumption are allowed by section
4-29; therefore, a person drinking his liquor in an automobile
parked on the premises of a licensed establishment would not
be within section 4-100.
IV. ColcLUsION

The South Carolina "brown bagging" law is "unique" 47 in
that no other state has a similar law which could create the
problem raised in Gaddy.48 It is conceivable that the court
could follow the liberal rule of Gaddy and through "judicial
legislation" make liquor by the drink a reality. It is doubtful,
however, that this will follow. It is a problem to be left to the
people and the legislature, not the courts.
The vociferous clamor of the minority has appealed for open
bars; this has been to no avail. Openly and reasonably they
have stated:
Neither brown bagging nor open bars, however, meet
the state's needs. South Carolina should have a realistic law that will allow drinkers to do openly what they
are going to do anyway, but under appropriate regula43.
44.
45.
46.

S.C.

CODE ANN. § 4-29 (2) (a) (Supp. 1969).
S.C. CODE AxN. § 4-100 (Supp. 1969).

173 S.E.2d 379.
Id.

47. Id. at 378.
48. The South Carolina statute was drafted using no other legislation as a
model. It was the result of combining elements of the Texas and Virginia
laws in addition to those sections written in by the drafters to meet the
particular needs. Interview with C. T. Goolsby, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of South Carolina, in Columbia, September 4, 1970.
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tion and revenue-raising provisions that will help state
49
government to raise cash.

As a result of the Gaddy decision, the liquor laws are left in
a state of flux which could only be effectively dealt with by
the enactment of new legislation either doing away with possession and consumption of alcoholic liquors, or allowing open
bars with reasonable tools and methods of enforcement. To do
away with alcoholic liquors would lead to insurmountable difficulties as already proven during the period of national prohibition. Obviously, this state can use the revenue from open
bars, revenue which has been legislatively and judicially excluded so far by section 4-29 and Gaddy.
WrT.AM E. JEKINSON, III

49. The Charleston Evening Post, July 9, 1970, at 12-A, Col. 1.
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